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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In markets where diﬀerent principals contract sequentially with the same agent, as when a buyer
purchases from multiple sellers, the contracts oﬀered by a downstream principal are often inﬂuenced
by the decisions taken, as well as the information disclosed, in upstream relationships.1
A buyer’s willingness to pay for a product may depend on its complementarity or substitutability
with the products and services of upstream vendors. For example, the value of a new software
application depends largely on its compatibility with the user’s operating system, hardware, and
other software applications. Furthermore, even in the absence of complementarities, the choice of
a product, the request for a service, or simply the path followed in visiting a website may reveal
valuable information about consumers’ preferences and idiosyncratic characteristics. Knowing what
products a consumer has purchased upstream thus allows a downstream seller to better tailor her
contract oﬀers and price discriminate. Personalized oﬀers based on upstream transactions have
indeed become common practice since the advent of online commerce and are present in a variety
of markets including software, travel, and pharmaceutical products.
An upstream seller who expects her buyers to contract with a downstream one is thus likely
to take advantage of her Stackelberg position by designing contract oﬀers in a way that optimally
controls for the inﬂuence they have on downstream contracting. There are two ways an upstream
contract can aﬀect a downstream one: directly, through the decisions it stipulates (contractual
externalities), and indirectly, through the information it discloses (informational externalities).
In this paper we investigate how a principal should optimally control for both types of external-
ities, designing a menu of contract oﬀers that screens the agent’s type and strategically discloses
information to a downstream principal.
We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream
level of trade, (b) the agent’s valuations are positively correlated, and (c) preferences in the down-
stream relationship are separable so that the level of trade is independent of upstream decisions,
then the optimal disclosure policy consists in oﬀering the agent full privacy. This holds regardless
of the price the downstream principal is willing to pay.
In fact, under conditions (a)-(c), a downstream seller is interested in getting information on
upstream decisions only if this is indirectly informative about the buyer’s exogenous type. The
only beneﬁts of disclosure then come from an information-trade eﬀect, i.e. the possibility of making
ap r o ﬁt by selling information to the downstream seller, and/or a rent-shifting eﬀect, that is, the
possibility of inducing the downstream seller to oﬀer the buyer a personalized discount.
Suppose the buyer has either a low or a high valuation for the product of the downstream seller.
If the latter believes the buyer’s valuation is high (say, because marketing surveys indicate that
the percentage of high-valuation buyers is signiﬁcantly higher than that of low-valuation ones),
the optimal price in the downstream relationship leaves no surplus to the buyer. In this case,
the upstream seller may attempt to induce the downstream one to oﬀer a discount by disclosing
information that is correlated with the buyer’s valuation. The rent-shifting eﬀect then consists in
1Hereafter, a principal is the party who designs the contract. We also adopt the convention of using masculine
pronouns for the agent/buyer and feminine pronouns for the principals/sellers.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 3
making the buyer pay a higher price upstream for the increase in his expected utility downstream.
However, for disclosure to be valuable, the buyer must be given an incentive to reveal his type.
When valuations are positively correlated, the extra rent a seller must leave to the buyer when
she discloses information more than oﬀsets both the rent-shifting and the information-trade eﬀects,
making full privacy optimal.
Conversely, we also prove that when any one of the above conditions is violated, there exist
preferences for which disclosure is strictly optimal, even if the upstream principal is not allowed,
or able, to sell information.
First, consider direct externalities. When the upstream principal is personally interested in the
downstream level of trade, as in the case of a vendor whose compensation depends on the sales (or
market share) of another vendor, she may well accept to pay the incentive costs of disclosure (in
terms of higher rents to the buyer) if this enables her to aﬀect decisions downstream. With positive
externalities, disclosure is optimal when it increases the downstream level of trade; with negative
externalities, when it decreases it.
Next, we relax the assumption of positive correlation in the agents’ valuations by considering the
case of two horizontally diﬀerentiated sellers. When the single crossing condition is of opposite sign
for upstream and downstream decisions, disclosure does not necessarily increase the rent that the
upstream principal must leave to the buyer, it may actually reduce it. By increasing the downstream
rent of those types who value the upstream product the least, disclosure creates countervailing
incentives that can be used to minimize the informational rents required for information revelation.
On the other hand, since disclosure is incentive-compatible only if trade in the upstream relationship
is not certain, it is optimal only when the cost of not selling to all types is small as compared with
the beneﬁt of increasing the probability of a price discount downstream.
Finally, we consider environments where the agents’ preferences are not separable, as in the case
of a buyer whose willingness to pay for a product depends on its complementarity, or substitutabil-
ity, with the products of an upstream seller (the case of contractual externalities). By introducing
uncertainty about upstream decisions (for example through lotteries, mixed strategies, or simply
by selling only to a subset of types), a seller can create rents for her buyers in the downstream
relationship. In this case, the optimal mechanism may also require a policy that discloses informa-
tion correlated with the upstream level of trade. With complements, disclosure is motivated by the
possibility of inducing the downstream seller to ask a lower price to consumers who have purchased
upstream, whereas with substitutes,t ot h o s ew h od i dn o t .
For each of the environments described above, we also compare the equilibrium contracts when
a principal cannot disclose information with the contracts that are oﬀered in equilibrium when
disclosure is permitted. Perhaps surprisingly, disclosure does not necessarily harm the agent, it
may actually increase his surplus in the two relationships. This is consistent with a claim that is
commonly made by vendors in their privacy policies, namely that consumers who agree to share
information with the vendor’s business partners may beneﬁt from personalized discounts and tailor-
made oﬀers.
The eﬀects of disclosure on total welfare — the sum of sellers’ proﬁts and consumer surplus
— remain however ambiguous. On the one hand, by reducing the distortions due to the initial4 Calzolari and Pavan
asymmetry of information, disclosure tends to increase eﬃciency in downstream contracting. On
the other hand, disclosure may introduce new distortions in upstream decisions. This may be due
to incentive compatibility or to the uncertainty about the level of upstream trade introduced with
the intent of leading to an increase in consumer surplus downstream.2
None of these results is really speciﬁc to buyer-seller relationships. We expect the determinants
of information disclosure discussed above to play an important role also in:
Labor relationships. An employer who hires a worker typically receives letters of recommendation
from previous employers describing the worker’s characteristics (talent, fairness, relations with
colleagues), but also the tasks performed in upstream relationships.
Insurance. Clients who purchase multiple policies are notiﬁed that relevant personal information
(e.g. the number of accidents in the past few years and the type of risk borne by policy-holders)
will be shared with partners.
Financial relationships. Venture capitalists often disclose information about a project’s proﬁtability,
as well as personal characteristics of entrepreneurs, to other investors in order to convince them
to join. Entrants in the credit card market get detailed information on potential customers from
credit bureaus and other lenders.
Regulation and taxation of multinational ﬁrms. Foreign regulators usually operate on the basis of
the information provided by domestic agencies. Information-sharing between domestic and foreign
tax authorities is often considered to be largely strategic and is at the heart of political debates.
In what follows, ﬁr s tw eb r i e ﬂy relate the paper to the pertinent literature. Section 2 then
describes the sequential contracting game and illustrates how optimal policies can be obtained
through a mechanism design approach. Section 3 derives the conditions for the optimality of full
privacy. Sections 4 and 5 examine the determinants of the disclosure of exogenous and endogenous
information. Section 6 concludes. Technical proofs are given in the Appendix.
Related literature
This paper is related to several lines of research in contract theory, mechanism design, and
industrial organization with asymmetric information.
Strategic information-sharing between ﬁrms has been examined in the literature on oligopolistic
competition (see Raith, 1998, for a survey), and in the ﬁnancial intermediation literature (Padilla
and Pagano, 1998, and Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). In these papers, before competing, ﬁrms
decide whether to share information with rivals. In our model, by contrast, upstream principals
are initially uninformed; in fact, they learn by contracting with the agent and create new private
information by taking decisions that aﬀect downstream principals. Sellers’ disclosure policies have
2For disclosure to have positive eﬀects on welfare and consumer surplus, it is important that buyers be able to
trust that ﬁrms will keep their promises about their privacy policies, as we assume in this paper. One way vendors
can increase consumers’ conﬁdence is by signing contracts with certiﬁcation intermediaries such as Better Business
Bureau, TRUSTe and WebTrust. By displaying the seal of these intermediaries, a vendor agrees to inform consumers
of what personally identiﬁable information is collected, which organization collects it, how it is used, with whom
it may be shared, and what choices are available to consumers regarding its collection, use and distribution. For
a detailed discussion of the importance of trust in e-commerce, see the Federal Trade Commission report “Privacy
Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace” 2000.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 5
also been analyzed by Lizzeri (1999) in a model where certiﬁcation intermediaries have a technology
to test the quality of the seller’s product and commit on what to disclose to competitive buyers.
Here, instead, we assume that the only way a principal can learn the agent’s private information is
through a screening mechanism.
A recent literature on consumers’ privacy considerse n v i r o n m e n t sw h e r es e l l e r sc a nu s ei n f o r m a -
tion on individual purchasing history to engage in product customization and price discrimination
(Acquisti and Varian, 2002; Dodds, 2002; and Taylor, 2003a,b). In this literature, however, the
choice of the disclosure policy is not endogenous.
Informational linkages between markets have been studied in the literature on auctions followed
by resale. Haile (1999) examines the eﬀects on revenue of bidders’ incentives to signal information
to the secondary market. Calzolari and Pavan (2004) and Zheng (2002) study optimal auctions
and derive revenue-maximizing selling procedures and disclosure policies.
Sequential common agency models have also been examined in Baron (1985), Bergman and
Välimäki (2004), Martimort (1999), and Prat and Rustichini (1998). In this literature, principals
oﬀer their contracts sequentially, but decisions are taken only after the agents have received all
proposals. On the contrary, we assume that the agent ﬁrst contracts with an upstream principal,
reveals his exogenous type, takes a payoﬀ-relevant decision, and then enters into a new bilateral
relationship with a second principal. This timing is more appropriate for examining the design of
optimal disclosure policies.
Segal (1999), and Segal and Whinston (2003) provide a general and unifying framework for
contracting with externalities. Martimort and Stole (2003) consider direct externalities between
principals in a simultaneous common agency game. Daughety and Reinganum (2002) examine the
role of informational externalities and conﬁdentiality in a model where two plaintiﬀss e q u e n t i a l l yﬁle
suit against the same defendant. Unlike these works, the current paper combines direct externalities
with informational ones and shows how they are fashioned by an upstream principal through the
design of an optimal disclosure policy.
2 The contracting environment
2.1 The model set up
Players. Since none of the results is truly speciﬁc to buyer-seller relationships, we ﬁnd it convenient
to describe the contracting environment as a common agency game where two principals, P1 and
P2, contract sequentially with the same agent, A.3
Allocations and preferences. Each principal must select a decision xi ∈ Xi and a transfer
ti ∈ Ti = R from A to Pi. The vector x ≡ (x1,x 2) ∈ X ≡X1 × X2 denotes a proﬁle of decisions for
the two principals. The agent’s preferences are represented by the function UA = vA(x,θ)−t1−t2,
and the two principals’ preferences by Ui = vi(x,θ)+ti, for i =1 ,2. The variable θ ∈ Θ denotes the
3The model can also be read as one with a continuum of buyers with independent valuations, provided that there
are no direct externalities among the buyers and that the sellers’ payoﬀs are additive in the trades. See, for example,
Taylor (2003a).6 Calzolari and Pavan





.x i =1denotes the decision to trade and xi =0the “status quo,” that is, xi =0
in the absence of a contract between A and Pi,w i t hvi(0,0,θ)=0for any θ ∈ Θ and i ∈ {1,2,A}.
The two principals are assumed to share a common prior Pr(θ)=p =1− Pr(θ).
That Θ and Xi are ﬁnite sets simpliﬁes the description of the stochastic mechanisms. As is
shown in the Appendix, Theorem 1 extends to environments where θ is continuously distributed
over [θ,θ] as well as to X1 = X2 = R+.
Contracts and privacy policies. Each principal oﬀers the agent a mechanism (hereafter also
referred to as a menu of contract oﬀers). A mechanism φ2 ∈ Φ2 for P2 consists of a message space
M2 along with a mapping φ2 : M2 7→ X2 × T2, where x2(m2) ∈ X2 and t2(m2) ∈ T2 denote
respectively the decision and the transfer associated with message m2.4 For her part, P1 oﬀers a
mechanism φ1 ∈ Φ1 that is characterized by a message space M1, a set of signals S that P1 will
disclose to P2, and a mapping φ1 : M1 7→ ∆(X1 × S) × T1. δ1(m1) ∈ ∆(X1 × S) and t1(m1) ∈ T1
stand for the joint lottery over X1×S and the expected transfer associated with message m1 ∈ M1.
With the standard abuse of notation in mechanism design, δ1(x1,s|m1) will denote the conditional
probability of x1 and s,g i v e nm1,a n dδ1(x1|m1)=
P
s∈S δ1(x1,s|m1) the associated probability
of trade. The mechanism φ1 embeds a disclosure policy d : M1 → 4(S): When the agent chooses
message m1,P 1 sends a signal s to P2 with probability d(s|m1)=
P
x1∈X1 δ1(x1,s|m1). We assume
S is suﬃciently rich to generate the desired posterior beliefs for P2: as we show below, since Θ
and X1 are ﬁnite, it will suﬃce to treat S also as a ﬁnite set. Note that the mechanism φ1 is
(possibly) stochastic for two reasons: First, P1 may want to create uncertainty about x1 in order
to inﬂuence the contracts oﬀered by P2; second, it may be in the interest of P1 not to reveal to P2
all the information disclosed in the upstream relationship. In other words, P1 may ﬁnd it optimal
to disclose to P2 only a noisy signal of (θ,x1).5 P1 is not exogenously compelled to release any
particular information, so she can select the disclosure policy she wants.
We assume each principal can commit perfectly to her mechanism, which also implies that P1
can commit credibly to the disclosure policy of her choosing.6 With this assumption we rule out
two possible scenarios. In the ﬁrst, P1 discloses more information than allowed by φ1. In the second,
P1 publicly announces a disclosure policy d but then secretly oﬀers the agent a side contract with
ad i ﬀerent policy.
As is standard in common agency games, we also assume that neither principal can contract
over the decisions of the other.
Finally, we denote by τ(φ1) the price P2 pays to observe the signals disclosed by φ1.W ew a n t
τ(φ1) to be the price for information and not for the distribution over X1. To this end, we assume
τ(φ1) is contracted after φ1 has been executed, so that P1 cannot threaten P2 with changing her
decision if she fails to pay τ. Instead of modelling a bargaining game between P1 and P2 explicitly,
we consider a set of rational prices that can be the result of various bargaining procedures. Let
4In this environment, P2 never beneﬁts from oﬀering a stochastic mechanism.
5Because of quasi-linearity, P2 i sn e v e ri n t e r e s t e di nl e a r n i n gt1.
6If P1 were obliged to disclose m1,s h em i g h tﬁnd it optimal to induce A to randomize over M1 (see Bester and
Strausz, 2001 and Laﬀont and Tirole 1990 for dynamic contracting models with partial commitment).Privacy in Sequential Contracting 7
U2 (φ1) be the expected payoﬀ for P2 in the continuation game where she observes the signals
disclosed by φ1 and UND
2 (φ1) in the continuation game in which she receives no information. Given
φ1, we deﬁne the set of rational prices as T(φ1)={τ : τ = γ[U2(φ1) − UND
2 (φ1)] for γ ∈ [0,1]}.
The parameter γ captures the fraction of the value that P2 attaches to the information disclosed
by φ1 that P1 can appropriate through the price τ(φ1).C l e a r l y ,τ(φ1)=0for any γ if φ1 does not
reveal any valuable information.
Timing: a sequential contracting game
-A tt = 0,Aprivately learns θ.
-A tt = 1,P 1 announces a public mechanism φ1 ∈ Φ1. If A rejects φ1, the game ends and all
players are left with their reservation payoﬀs, which are set to zero. If A accepts φ1,h ec h o o s e sa
message m1 and pays an expected transfer t1(m1); a decision x1 ∈ X1 and a signal s ∈ S are then
selected with probability δ1(x1,s|m1). The realization of the lottery δ1(m1) is observed jointly by
A and P1.
-A tt = 2,P 2 pays τ(φ1), receives information from P1 and oﬀers a mechanism φ2 ∈ Φ2.I f A
rejects φ2, the game is over. Otherwise, A reports a message m2, which induces a decision x2(m2)
and a transfer t2(m2).
Assuming that φ1 is public is equivalent to assuming that P2 can observe the mapping φ1 :
M1 7→ ∆(X1 × S) × T1 but not m1 and x1.
That the game ends after A rejects φ1 is clearly not without loss of generality. However, note
that in the game where A can contract with P2 after rejecting φ1, there exist equilibria where P1
informs P2 about the rejection such that all types obtain zero surplus with P2 out-of-equilibrium.
These equilibria also satisfy forward induction reﬁnements such as the intuitive criterion of Cho and
Kreps (1987) and lead to the highest payoﬀ for P1.R a t h e rt h a nr e l yo nr e ﬁnements to determine
A’s outside option in the upstream relationship, we prefer, given the focus of the analysis, to assume
it is exogenously ﬁxed to zero.
2.2 Contract design
The game described above is a sequential version of the simultaneous common agency games with
adverse selection examined in Martimort (1992), Martimort and Stole (2002, 2003), and Stole
(1991). A strategy for P1 is simply the choice of a mechanism φ1 ∈ Φ1. For P2, as t r a t e g yi s
a mapping from Φ1 and S onto the set of mechanisms Φ2.7 The agent’s strategy speciﬁes the
reports to each principal as a function of the agent’s information set, i.e. m1 = φ1
A(θ,φ1), and
m2 = φ2
A(θ,φ1,m 1,x 1,t 1,s,φ 2).
A strategy proﬁle is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if and only if: each principal selects a
mechanism that is sequentially optimal given the strategies of the agent and the other principal;
7Although φ2 depends on φ1, the feasibility of the decisions contemplated in φ2 does not depend on the particular
decision x1. This is a restriction. Calzolari and Pavan (2004), for example, consider the design of optimal disclosure
policies for an auctioneer who expects buyers to resell in a secondary market. As resale can take place only if a buyer
has received the good in the primary market, the feasibility of an allocation in the secondary market depends on the
decisions taken in the primary market, so that the above assumption is clearly violated in auctions followed by resale.8 Calzolari and Pavan
for each signal s on the equilibrium path, P2 updates beliefs using Bayes’ rule; and A sends only
payoﬀ-maximizing messages.
It is well known that in games where agents contract with multiple mechanism designers, the
standard version of the revelation principle is not valid and the characterization of the entire set of
common agency equilibria is problematic [Epstein and Peters (1999), Martimort and Stole (2002),
Peters (2001), Pavan and Calzolari (2004)]. In this paper, however, we are interested only in the
properties of the equilibrium contracts that lead to the highest payoﬀ for the upstream principal.8
It then suﬃces to search for mechanisms φ∗
1 and {φ∗
2(s)}s∈S with the following properties:9
(i) φ∗
1 : Θ 7→ ∆(X1 × S) × T1 and φ∗
2(s):Θ × X1 7→ X2 × T2;
(ii) the agent ﬁnds it optimal to contract with both principals and truthfully report θ to P1 and
(θ,x1) to P2;
(iii) φ∗
2(s) is optimal for P2 — any other mechanism φ2(s) that is individually rational and
incentive-compatible for the agent leads to a lower payoﬀ for P2;
(iv) φ∗
1 and {φ∗
2(s)}s∈S are optimal for P1 —a n yo t h e rφ1 and {φ2(s)}s∈S that dominate φ∗
1 and
{φ∗
2(s)}s∈S necessarily violate either (ii) or (iii).
Conditions (i)-(iv) identify equilibrium allocations that yield the highest payoﬀ for P1 in an
environment where both principals can induce the agent to follow their recommendations and
where P1 can also induce P2 to oﬀer the contracts that are most favorable to her when the latter
is indiﬀerent.10
If there exist mechanisms satisfying (i)-(iv), there also exists a sequential common agency equi-
librium sustaining φ∗
1 and {φ∗
2(s)}s∈S. That is, we can always complete the description of the
equilibrium by specifying a reaction for P2 to any possible φ1 and a strategy for the agent (φ∗1
A ,φ ∗2
A )
such that it is optimal for P1 to oﬀer φ∗
1 and for P2 to oﬀer {φ∗
2(s)}s∈S.
The equilibrium described above can be characterized by backward induction. Consider ﬁrst
the mechanism design problem faced by P2. For any extended type θE











≡ v2(x1,x 2,θ). Also, let
U2
A(θE













denote the downstream surplus A obtains with P2 when he truthfully reports his extended type
θE





2 ;s) ≡ vA(x2(b θ
E
2 ;s),θE








8For similar selection arguments in dynamic contracting with a single principal, see Laﬀont and Tirole (1990).
9In Pavan and Calzolari (2004), we have shown that any equilibrium outcome of any unrestricted game in which
principals can choose mechanisms with arbitrarily complex message spaces can also be sustained as an equilibrium
outcome in the restricted game in which principals are constrained to oﬀer direct mechanisms in which the message
space is the agent’s extended type and includes only payoﬀ-relevant information. With quasi-linear utilities, upstream
transfers play no role on downstream contracting and do not need to be included into Θ
E
2 .
10The signal s c a nt h u sa l s ob er e a da st h er e c o m m e n d a t i o nt h a tP1 sends to P2 about the mechanism to oﬀer to
the agent.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 9




Finally, let S (d;φ1) ≡ {s : d(s|θ) > 0 for some θ ∈ Θ} represent the set of signals associated
with the disclosure policy of mechanism φ1. Assuming φ1 induces A to truthfully reveal θ, for any
signal s ∈ S (d;φ1), P2’s posterior beliefs over ΘE
2 are given by11
μ(θE





An optimal mechanism for P2 thus solves the following program
P2(s):
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨



















such that for any θE







2 ;s) ≥ 0( IR2)
U2
A(θE





where (IR2) and (IC2) are the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints. Note
that we are implicitly assuming there is no way A can credibly disclose (x1,t 1) to P2, so that the
latter has to provide incentives for truthful revelation.
Consider now the problem faced by P1. At t =1 ,P 1 designs a mechanism φ1 — with reaction
{φ2(s)}s∈S —t h a ts o l v e s
P1 :
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




































δ1(x1,s|ˆ θ) − t1(ˆ θ), ∀(θ,b θ) ∈ Θ2 (IC1)
φ2(s) solves P2(s) for any s ∈ S (d;φ1)( SR)
In addition to standard individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints, the (SR)
constraint in P1 guarantees the optimality of P2’s reaction. Treating {φ2(s)}s∈S as a choice variable
in P1 amounts to selecting the equilibrium which is most favorable to P1.
Before analyzing the optimal contracts, we ﬁnd it useful to formally deﬁne disclosure as well as
contracts that optimally induce it.
Deﬁnition 1 The mechanism φ1 discloses information if and only if it assigns positive measure to
signals that lead to diﬀerent posterior beliefs over ΘE
2 : Formally, there exist signals sl ∈ S (d;φ1)
and sm ∈ S (d;φ1), with sl 6= sm, such that μ(θE
2 ;sl) 6= μ(θE
2 ;sm) for some θE
2 ∈ ΘE
2 .
Information disclosure is optimal for P1 if and only if there exists a mechanism φ1 that discloses
information and solves P1, and there are no other solutions to P1 that do not disclose information.
11To simplify the notation, we omit the dependence of μ on φ1, when this does not create confusion.10 Calzolari and Pavan
3 On the optimality of privacy
In this section, we identify and discuss preferences that make full privacy the optimal policy for
P1. To save on notation, let ∆θ ≡ θ − θ > 0, ∆θvA(x,θ) ≡ vA(x,θ) − vA(x,θ), ∆x1vA(x,θ) ≡
vA(1,x 2,θ)−vA(0,x 2,θ), ∆θ[∆x1vA(x,θ)] ≡ ∆x1vA(x,θ)−∆x1vA(x,θ) and analogously for ∆x2vA(x,θ)
and ∆θ[∆x2vA(x,θ)].
Player i’s preferences are additively separable if vi(x,θ)=v1
i (x1,θ)+v2
i (x2,θ) with v1
i (0,θ)=
v2
i (0,θ)=0 ,a n dindependent of xj if vi(xi,x j,θ)=vi(xi,θ). The sign of the single crossing
condition in player i’s preferences is the same for upstream and downstream decisions if, for any
x1 and x2, sign{∆θ[∆x2vi(x,θ)]} = sign{∆θ[∆x1vi(x,θ)]}.
Theorem 1 Assume the following: (a) P1’s preferences are independent of x2;( b )t h es i g no f
the single crossing condition in the agent’s preferences is the same for upstream and downstream
decisions; (c) the preferences of P2 and A are additively separable. Then no disclosure is optimal
for P1, no matter what price P2 is willing to pay to receive information.
The formal proof is in the Appendix. Here, let us simply sketch the intuition. Without loss,
assume the sign of the single crossing condition is positive. When the agent’s preferences are
separable, this is equivalent to assuming that the valuations v1
A(1,θ) and v2
A(1,θ) are both increasing
in θ. When P2’s preferences are also separable, the optimal mechanism for P2 does not depend on
x1. It follows that under (a)-(c), the only beneﬁto fi n ﬂuencing downstream decisions by disclosing
information correlated with θ comes from a rent-shifting and/or an information-trade eﬀect. The
ﬁrst consists in designing a policy that induces P2 to leave the agent a rent and then set a higher





A (θ)) denote the mechanism that P2 oﬀers if she receives no infor-
mation from P1. Under separability, this mechanism is not a function of φ1, for the downstream
surplus W2(x2,θ) ≡ v2
2(x2,θ)+v2
A(x2,θ) is independent of upstream decisions.
Now, suppose φ1 — with reaction φ2 — is optimal and discloses information. In this case, there
exists another individually rational and incentive-compatible mechanism φND
1 — with reaction φND
2
— that does not release any information, that induces the same distribution over X1,a n di ss u c h
that12
U1(φ1) − U1(φND




























12To compact notation, we omit the dependence of U1 on φ2.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 11
When γ =0 ,τ(φ1)=0for any φ1, the information-trade eﬀect is absent, and hence the only beneﬁt
of disclosure comes from the rent-shifting eﬀect, which corresponds to the ﬁrst term in (1).
Conversely, when γ =1 , the rent-shifting eﬀect is absent since any money that P1 can extract
from A for the increase in the informational rent she expects from P2 must be deducted from the
price τ(φ1). When this is the case, the only beneﬁt of disclosure derives from the possibility of
increasing eﬃciency in the downstream relationship, as indicated in the second term in (1).
Both the rent-shifting and the information-trade eﬀects may well be positive. Disclosure, how-
ever, also aﬀects the incentives for the agent to misrepresent his type to P1 and hence the rent the
latter must give A for truthful information, as indicated in the last term in (1). Under (b) and (c)
this eﬀect more than oﬀsets the ﬁrst two. It follows that in the absence of direct externalities (that
is, when (a) also holds), the optimal policy for P1 is to oﬀer the agent full privacy.
To see this, note that φ2 leaves no rent to θ and a rent U2
A(¯ θ;s)=∆θv2
A(x2(θ;s),θ) to ¯ θ which
is increasing in the posterior odds μ(θ;s)/μ(θ;s) and hence in d(s|θ)/d(s|θ). Furthermore, in any







A(θ,s)d(s|θ). Among all mechanisms that induce the same distribution over X1 as φ1 with-
out disclosing information, consider a mechanism φND













A (θ). It is easy to see that if φ1 is individually rational and incentive-
compatible, so is φND






















A(¯ θ;s)[d(s|θ) − d(s|θ)] ≤ 0 (3)
Indeed, suppose P1 discloses only two signals, s1 and s2,a n dl e td(s1|¯ θ)=d(s1|θ)+ε and d(s2|¯ θ)=
d(s2|θ) − ε for some ε>0. Since U2
A(¯ θ;s) is increasing in d(s|θ)/d(s|θ), U2






A(¯ θ;s1) − U2
A(¯ θ;s2)
¤
ε ≤ 0. This result clearly extends to more
general disclosure policies. The most favorable signals are always disclosed with a higher probability
when A announces a low type. It follows that the additional surplus A obtains with P2 when P1
discloses information is more than oﬀset by the increase in the rent P1 must sacriﬁce to A to induce
him to reveal information, making disclosure unproﬁtable for P1.
Next consider the information-trade eﬀect and assume γ =1 , in which case disclosure is mo-
tivated entirely by the possibility of increasing eﬃciency in the downstream relationship. Again

























2 (θ),θ)]12 Calzolari and Pavan
which is never positive since xND
2 (θ) maximizes (1 − p)W2(x2,θ) − p∆θv2
A(x2,θ). The explanation
is simple. When γ =1 , the price τ(φ1)=U2(φ1)−U2(φND
1 ) allows P1 to fully internalize the eﬀect
of disclosure on U2.I fP1 could directly control x2(θ), she would then optimally trade oﬀ eﬃciency
and rent extraction by maximizing (1 − p)W2(x2,θ) − p∆θv2
A(x2,θ). But since this is exactly the
same decision P2 takes when her posterior beliefs are equal to the prior, the best P1 can do is to
commit not to disclose any information.
Finally, note that if disclosure is not proﬁtable when γ =1 , it is clearly not proﬁtable when
γ<1. We thus conclude that under (a)-(c), the optimal policy is always full privacy, irrespective
of the price P2 is willing to pay for information.
Theorem 1 does not depend on the discreteness of Θ, X1 and X2. As we show in the Appendix,
the theorem extends to environments where θ is continuously distributed over [θ,θ] and Xi = R+
for i =1 ,2, under the usual additional assumptions for the continuous case, which guarantee that
in the canonical single mechanism designer problem, the optimal policies xi(θ) are deterministic
with no bunching.
It is interesting to compare the result in Theorem 1 with Baron and Besanko (1984). They
consider a dynamic single-principal single-agent relationship and show that when type is constant
over time, the optimal long-term contract under full commitment consists in a sequence of static
optimal contracts. Although the two results appear similar, they are actually quite diﬀerent. In
Baron and Besanko, there is a single principal who maximizes the intertemporal payoﬀ v1(x1,θ)+
v2(x2,θ)+t(θ), whereas in our setting the upstream principal maximizes only v1(x1,θ)+t(θ)+τ,
where τ =0in the absence of disclosure. This implies that P1 may well be happy to reduce the
joint payoﬀ for the two principals, if by so doing she can appropriate a larger part of the total
surplus, as is illustrated in the next section. Also, even if P1 were to maximize the principals’ joint
payoﬀ, she would not necessarily oﬀer the static optimal contracts. This would be the case if the
preferences of the downstream principal were not only separable but also independent of x1, as in
Baron and Besanko. When instead they are only separable, the static optimal contracts — which
coincide with the contracts that are oﬀered in equilibrium when P1 does not disclose information —
fail to internalize the externality of x1 on P2.
The next result provides a converse to Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 When any one of the conditions in Theorem 1 is violated, there exist preferences for
which disclosure is strictly optimal for P1, even if P2 does not pay for information.
In this sense, the conditions of Theorem 1 are not only suﬃcient but “almost necessary” to
make privacy in sequential contracting optimal. The proof follows from the results of the next
two sections, where we examine the determinants of the disclosure of exogenous and endogenous
information separately. To prove that disclosure can be optimal whatever rational price P2 is willing
to pay, we consider the least favorable scenario where τ(φ1)=0for any φ1, in which case disclosure
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4 Disclosure of exogenous information
To separate the eﬀects associated with the disclosure of exogenous information (about θ)f r o m
those associated with the disclosure of endogenous information (about x1), in this section, we again
consider an environment where preferences in the downstream relationship are separable so that
P2 is interested in receiving information about x1 only if this is indirectly informative about θ.I n
particular, assume the following holds.
Condition 1 The agent’s preferences are separable: vA(x1,x 2,θ)=a(θ)x1 +b(θ)x2; P2’s prefer-
ences are independent of θ and x1: v2(x1,x 2,θ)=m2x2.
Assuming that the preferences of the downstream principal are not only separable but inde-
pendent of θ and x1 shortens the exposition without any signiﬁcant eﬀect on the results.13 In
a buyer-seller relationship, m2 ≤ 0 can be interpreted as the marginal cost to the downstream
seller. To make the analysis interesting, we then assume m2+b(θ) > 0 for any θ, which guarantees
that, under complete information, it is always eﬃcient to trade downstream. We also assume that
∆b ≡ b(θ) − b(θ) > 0. Under these conditions, the solution to P2(s) assigns the same allocation
to θE
2 =( θ,1) and θE
2 =( θ,0) and is equivalent to a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer at a price t2(s)=¯ b if




and t2(s)=b otherwise. As a consequence, P1 needs to disclose only
two signals, s1 and s2, such that t2(s1)=b and t2(s2)=b.14 This also implies that the optimal
disclosure policy must satisfy
d(s1|θ) ≥ Hd(s1|θ)( SR1)
d(s2|θ) ≤ Hd(s2|θ)( SR2)




∆b ).G i v e ns1, trade in the downstream relationship occurs only if θ = θ and
the agent gets zero surplus; while, given s2, trade occurs with both types and θ enjoys a downstream
rent equal to ∆b.
When H<1 [equivalently p>(b+m2)/
¡¯ b + m2
¢
], P2 asks a high price in the event she receives
no information from P1. We call prior beliefs that satisfy this condition unfavorable to the agent. On
the contrary, P2’s beliefs are favorable when H ≥ 1. Also note that when H<1, (SR1) is implied
by (SR2) and no disclosure is formally equivalent to sending signal s1, whereas the opposite is true
with favorable beliefs in which case no disclosure corresponds to sending only signal s2.
4.0.1 Direct externalities
Suppose now that P1’s payoﬀ depends directly on x2, as in the case of a seller whose compensation
is based on his relative performance compared to another vendor. An alternative example examined
13Adding an externality q2 (θ)x1 to P2’s preferences does not aﬀect the downstream decisions. Also, letting m2
depend on θ does not add much to the analysis since the virtual surplus for the P2 −A relationship already depends
on θ through its eﬀect on A’s payoﬀ.
14For any mechanism φ1 that discloses more than two signals, there exists another mechanism φ
0 that discloses at
most two signals which is payoﬀ-equivalent for all players.14 Calzolari and Pavan
in the literature (Martimort and Stole, 2004) is one where P1 and P2 are two retailers purchasing
from a common manufacturer. When the products of the two retailers are strategic substitutes, P1
may ﬁnd it optimal to disclose information about the manufacturer to inﬂuence the downstream
retailer’s decision to purchase additional units. To capture the possibility of direct externalities,
assume the following holds.
Condition 2 P1 is personally interested in x2 : v1(x1,x 2,θ)=m1x1 + ex2.
The term m1 can be read as the marginal cost to P1. We require that m1 + a(θ) > 0 for
any θ so that it is always eﬃcient to trade in the upstream relationship. We also assume that
∆a ≡ a(θ) − a(θ) > 0:The sign of the single crossing condition is thus the same for x1 and x2,
implying that disclosure is costly for P1.
Depending on the environment, the externality e can be either positive or negative. It is probably
negative in the examples above. However, it could be positive in the case of a telephone company
that is considering switching to optical ﬁber and sharing the network of a downstream Internet or
cable TV provider.
Under Conditions (1) and (2), the surplus that A expects from the two relationships given φ1 is
UA(θ;φ1)=δ1(1|θ)¯ a + d(s2|θ)∆b − t1(θ) and UA(θ;φ1)=δ1(1|θ)a − t1(θ). At the optimum (IR1)
and (IC1) bind, which implies that UA(θ;φ1)=0 , UA(θ;φ1)=δ1(1|θ)∆a + d(s2|θ)∆b and
U1(φ1)=pδ1(1|θ)(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)δ1(1|θ)(m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a)+pe (4)














Because trade in the downstream relationship occurs with certainty when θ = θ a n dw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y
d(s2|θ) when θ = θ, the expected externality of x2 on P1 is pe +( 1− p)d(s2|θ)e.
Since preferences in the downstream relationship are separable and there are no marginal eﬀects
of x2 on v1(x1,x 2,θ)+v1
A(x1,θ), the joint lottery δ1(x1,s|θ) can be decomposed into a disclosure
policy d(s|θ) and a trade policy δ1(1|θ),w h e r ed(s|θ) and δ1(1|θ) can be treated as independent
distributions. This also implies that δ1(1|θ) can either be read as the probability of trade or as the
quantity traded, with δ1(1|θ) ∈ [0,1].15
Finally, note that constraint (IC1) is an “adjusted” monotonicity condition which reduces to
the standard monotonicity condition δ1(1|θ) ≥ δ1(1|θ) when no information is disclosed. On the
contrary, when P1 discloses information, monotonicity becomes strict for it requires δ1(1|θ) <
δ1(1|θ). Indeed, suppose P1 sells with certainty to both types. Then the low type, who does not
expect any surplus in the downstream relationship, would always choose the contract with the
lowest price. However, since disclosure requires that P1 sends the most favorable signal s2 with
15This is not true with non-separable preferences, because the joint distribution over X1 and S is what determines
the surplus that A and P1 expect from downstream contracting.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 15
higher probability when A reports θ than θ, the high type would also ﬁnd it optimal to choose the
low-type contract, making P1’s mechanism not incentive-compatible.
It follows that there are two possible costs associated with disclosure. The ﬁrst is the extra rent £
d(s2|θ) − d(s2|θ)
¤
∆b that P1 must cede to θ, as discussed in the previous section. The second is
the reduction in the level of trade with θ required by (IC1). However, while it is always optimal for
P1 to trade with the high type, trading with the low type is proﬁtable only if the “virtual surplus”
m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0.
To see how P1 optimally trades the possibility to inﬂuence x2 oﬀ against the costs of disclosure,
consider unfavorable beliefs. Since SR2 is always binding at the optimum and δ∗
1(1|θ)=1 , (IC1)
can be rewritten as δ1(1|θ) ≤ 1−(1−H)∆b
∆ad(s2|θ). Disclosure is then optimal for P1 if and only if
(1 − p)e ≥ p(1 − H)∆b +( 1− p)(1 − H) ∆b
∆aI[m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a],
where I[·] is an indicator function taking value one if [·] > 0 and zero otherwise. The left-hand side
is the marginal externality associated with an increase in the downstream level of trade generated
by an increase in d(s2|θ). The right-hand side combines the cost of the increase in the rent for θ
with that of reducing the upstream level of trade with θ, which is relevant only when trading with
the low type is proﬁtable, that is when m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a>0.
With favorable beliefs, things are symmetrically opposite. Disclosure is optimal only when P1
has a strong incentive to reduce the downstream level of trade, as we show in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 With direct externalities, disclosure is motivated by the possibility of inﬂuencing
the downstream level of trade. Suppose preferences are as in Conditions (1) and (2). When P2’s
beliefs are unfavorable to the agent, disclosure is optimal if and only if there are large positive
externalities. When they are favorable, disclosure is optimal for large negative externalities.
Note that in either case, P1 never fully informs P2 about θ. Indeed, full disclosure is costly (in
terms of rent for θ and ineﬃcient trade with θ) and is either unnecessary to induce the desired level
of trade or else incentive-incompatible.
We now turn to the eﬀects of disclosure on individual payoﬀs. We compare the optimal contracts
with disclosure (formally derived in the proof of Proposition 1) with those that would be oﬀered
if P1 were not able, or allowed, to disclose information. Because preferences are separable in the
downstream relationship, these contracts simply consist in a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer at price t1 = a
if m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0 and at price t1 = a otherwise.
Corollary 1 When P2’s beliefs are unfavorable, disclosure leads to a Pareto-improvement: P1 and
A are strictly better oﬀ, whereas P2 is indiﬀerent. When P2’s beliefs are favorable, disclosure makes
A worse oﬀ, P1 better oﬀ,a n dl e a v e sP2 indiﬀerent. The eﬀect of disclosure on total welfare is
positive for large negative externalities and negative otherwise.
P2 is not aﬀected by disclosure since the optimal mechanism φ∗
1 makes her indiﬀerent between
asking the prices she would have asked in the absence of disclosure and the equilibrium ones.
Together with the fact that P2’s preferences are independent of x1 so that she is not personally16 Calzolari and Pavan
aﬀected by changes in upstream decisions, this implies that P2 is just as well oﬀ as in the absence
of disclosure.




1(1|θ)∆a + d∗(s2|θ)∆b. First, assume unfavorable
beliefs. If m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<0, A is clearly better oﬀ, since in the absence of disclosure he
gets no surplus with either principal. If instead m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0, then without disclosure,
A gets UA(θ;φND
1 )=∆a and UA(θ;φND
1 )=0 . As shown in the Appendix (proof of Proposition
1), the optimal contracts with disclosure are such that d∗(s2|θ)=m i n {1; ∆a/[(1 − H)∆b]} and
δ∗
1(1|θ)=1− d∗(s2|θ)(1− H) ∆b
∆a, implying that A strictly beneﬁts from disclosure. Indeed, even
if disclosure comes at the expenses of a reduction of δ1(1|θ), this is more than compensated by the
increase in the downstream rent. The reason is that disclosure increases the surplus that θ obtains
by mimicking θ, but also the surplus that θ obtains by truthfully reporting his type. In turn this
allows P1 to increase the rent she cedes to the high type without inducing the low type to mimic.
With favorable beliefs, things are diﬀerent. In this case, P1 induces P2 to ask a higher price.
Furthermore, when m1 +a−
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0,P 1 reduces the level of trade with the low type to satisfy
(IC1). As a consequence, A always suﬀers from disclosure. The eﬀect on total welfare then depends
on how strong the externality is. For moderate values, the negative eﬀect on A prevails and welfare
decreases with disclosure; for large negative externalities, the opposite is true.
4.0.2 Horizontal diﬀerentiation and countervailing incentives
We now turn to environments where the agent’s valuations for x1 and x2 are negatively correlated,
as when a buyer has horizontally diﬀerentiated preferences for the products of two sellers. Alterna-
tively, A could be a retailer, or a marketing agent, with superior information than manufacturers
about consumers’ location in the space of characteristics diﬀerentiating the two brands.
Disclosure is now motivated by the rent-shifting eﬀect, i.e. the possibility of appropriating the
surplus A obtains in the downstream relationship. As was shown in the previous section, this is
never possible when A’s valuations are positively correlated, for in that case any increase in the
agent’s downstream surplus is more than oﬀset by the increase in the rent that P1 must cede to
induce truthful revelation. But when the two products are horizontally diﬀerentiated, those types
who can potentially beneﬁt from the rent in the downstream relationship are those who attach less
value to the product provided by the upstream principal. As a consequence, disclosure may create
countervailing incentives that help P1 extract more surplus from the agent. On the other hand,
disclosure may come at the cost of an ineﬃcient level of trade upstream, required by incentive
compatibility.
To illustrate, assume preferences in the downstream relationship are described by Condition 1,
and suppose the following also holds.16
16An example of horizontally diﬀerentiated preferences is vA(x1,x 2,θ)=( 1− θ)x1 + θx2. See Mezzetti (1997)
for an analysis of countervailing incentives in (simultaneous) common agency games with horizontally diﬀerentiated
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Condition 3 P1’s preferences are independent of θ and x2: v1(x1,x 2,θ)=m1x1; the single cross-
ing condition in the agent’s preferences has opposite signs for x1 and x2: ∆a<0 < ∆b.
To make things interesting, we continue to assume that m1 + a(θ) > 0 for any θ so that it is
always eﬃcient to trade in the upstream relationship.
P1’s optimal mechanism maximizes
U1(φ1)=p[δ1(1|θ)(m1 + a)+d(s2|θ)∆b − UA(θ;φ1)] + (1 − p)[δ1(1|θ)(m1 + a) − UA(θ;φ1)]
subject to UA(θ;φ1) ≥ 0,U A(θ;φ1) ≥ 0, (SR1), (SR2) and
UA(θ;φ1) ≥ UA(θ;φ1)+d(s2|θ)∆b − δ1(1|θ)|∆a|, (IC1)
UA(θ;φ1) ≥ UA(θ;φ1) − d(s2|θ)∆b + δ1(1|θ)|∆a|. (IC1)
Note that θ continues to get ∆b more than θ when P2 asks a low price, but now gets |∆a| less than
θ from trading with P1. As a consequence, it is not possible to determine which constraint binds a
priori since this depends on which countervailing incentive prevails. Nevertheless, in any optimal
mechanism, at least one (IR1) and one (IC1) constraint necessarily bind, and trade with the low
type occurs with certainty, i.e. δ∗
1(1|θ)=1 .
As for the optimal disclosure policy, when P2’s prior beliefs are favorable, no disclosure is always
optimal, since having P2 ask a low price increases the price θ is willing to pay for the upstream
product and reduces the rent for θ.
Consider next the case of unfavorable beliefs. In the absence of disclosure, the optimal mecha-
nism consists in trading with either type at a price t1 = a if m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a| ≥ 0 and only with
the low type at a price t1 = a otherwise. When m1+a−
1−p
p |∆a| < 0,d i s c l o s u r ei sa l w a y so p t i m a l .
Indeed, by adopting a disclosure policy such that d∗(s2|θ)=m i n {1,
|∆a|
∆b } and d∗(s2|θ)=Hd(s2|θ),
P1 can fully appropriate the surplus d∗(s2|θ)∆b that θ expects from downstream contracting with-
out increasing the rent for θ. What is more, disclosure allows P1 to sell also to θ with positive
probability, once again without leaving any rent to the low type.
When m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a| ≥ 0, things are more complicated because disclosure may require a
reduction in the level of trade with θ, which is costly for P1. Indeed, using (SR2) and δ∗
1(1|θ)=1
and combining (IC1) with (IC1), gives δ1(1|θ) ≤ 1 − (1 − H) ∆b
|∆a|d(s2|θ) which is strictly less than
one when P1 discloses information, that is when d(s2|θ) > 0.
The marginal eﬀect of increasing d(s2|θ) is then given by
pH∆b − p(1 − H) ∆b
|∆a|(m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a|)+( 1− p)H∆b, (5)
where the ﬁrst term is simply the beneﬁt of increasing the probability of a downstream price
discount for the high type (recall that d(s2|θ)=Hd(s2|θ)), the second term is the cost of reducing
the level of trade with the high type, and the third term is the reduction in the rent for θ generated
by countervailing incentives.17 R e w r i t i n g( 5 ) ,w et h u sh a v et h a td i s c l o s u r ei so p t i m a lf o rP1 if and










∗(s2|θ)∆b.18 Calzolari and Pavan
Proposition 2 When x1 and x2 are horizontally diﬀerentiated, disclosure is motivated by the pos-
sibility of exploiting countervailing incentives to appropriate surplus from downstream contracting.
Suppose preferences are as in Conditions (1) and (3). Disclosure is optimal if and only if P2’s
b e l i e f sa r eu n f a v o r a b l et ot h ea g e n ta n dt h ec o s to fr e d u c i n gt h el e v e lo ft r a d ew i t ht h eh i g ht y p ei s
small.
Finally, consider the eﬀect of disclosure on individual payoﬀsa n dw e l f a r e .P2 is not aﬀected by
disclosure, since φ∗
1 makes her indiﬀerent between asking the prices she would have asked in the
absence of disclosure and the equilibrium ones. As for the agent, when m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a| < 0,A
gets the same payoﬀ as when P1 is not allowed to disclose information, since the increase in his rent
with P2 is entirely appropriated by P1.B u t w h e n m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a| ≥ 0, disclosure reduces the
rent of the low type from |∆a| to δ∗
1(1|θ)|∆a|−d∗(s2|θ)∆b without increasing that of the high type,
thus making A strictly worse oﬀ. Indeed, by increasing the surplus of the high type, disclosure
reduces the low type’s incentive to mimic and thus allows P1 to reduce the rent she must cede for
truthful revelation.
In terms of welfare, when m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a| < 0, disclosure increases th el e v e lo ft r a d ei nb o t h
relationships and thus boosts eﬃciency. When instead m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a| ≥ 0, disclosure increases
the level of trade in the downstream relationship but reduces it upstream, with a negative net eﬀect
on welfare.
Corollary 2 Disclosure increases welfare if and only if m1 +a−
1−p
p |∆a| < 0. P1 strictly beneﬁts
from disclosure, P2 is indiﬀerent, and A is worse oﬀ if disclosure reduces the upstream level of
trade, indiﬀerent otherwise.
5 Disclosure of endogenous information
In this Section, we consider environments where the agent’s valuation in the downstream rela-
tionship depends on upstream decisions, as in the case of a buyer whose willingness to pay for a
downstream product or service depends on complementarity, or substitutability, with the products
and services purchased from an upstream vendor.
The reason why disclosure can be optimal when preferences are non-separable is that it permits
P1 to sustain a more proﬁtable level of trade upstream without eliminating the rent the agent
obtains in the downstream relationship. To illustrate, assume the following.
Condition 4 The agent’s preferences are not separable: vA(x1,x 2,θ)=a(θ)x1+bx2+gx1x2. The
two principals have preferences vi(x1,x 2,θ)=mixi for i =1 ,2.
The two products are complements if g>0 and substitutes if g<0. That the downstream
s u r p l u sd o e sn o td e p e n do nθ guarantees that disclosure is entirely about endogenous information.
We also assume that trade continues to generate positive surplus in both relationships, that is
m1 + a(θ) ≥ 0 for any θ, m2 + b ≥ 0 and m2 + b + g>0.18
18This also guarantees that P2 is indeed interested in receiving information about x1.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 19
5.0.3 Complements







2 =( x1,θ) and is equivalent to a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer at a price t2(s) ∈ {b,
b+g}.T h i si m p l i e st h a tP1 does not need to disclose more than two signals, s1, and s2, such that
t2(s1)=b+g and t2(s2)=b. Conditional on receiving information s2, a low price is optimal for P2
if and only if she assigns suﬃciently low probability to A’s having purchased the complementary
product from P1, that is, if and only if Pr(x1 =1 |s2)g ≤ (m2 + b)Pr(x1 =0 |s2), or equivalently
δ1(1,s 2)g ≤ (m2 + b)δ1(0,s 2), (SR2)
where δ1(x1,s 2)=pδ1(x1,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(x1,s 2|θ).19 The left-hand side is simply the cost of
leaving the agent an informational rent when asking a low price t2 = b, while the right-hand side
is the cost of not trading when asking a high price t2 = b + g.
Since A has no private information about his valuation for x2, P1 can appropriate the entire
surplus δ1(1,s 2)g that A expects from contracting with P2. This also implies that the rent P1 must
cede to A is independent of the disclosure policy, and is the same as in the absence of downstream
contracting, i.e. UA(θ;φ1)=δ1(1|θ)∆a and UA(θ;φ1)=0 . The optimal contracts then maximize
U1 = pδ1(1|θ)(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)δ1(1|θ)(m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a)+δ1(1,s 2)g
subject to (SR2).N o t et h a t(m2+b)δ1(0,s 2) is an upper bound for the rent P2 leaves to the agent.
To maximize this upper bound, it is always optimal to send signal s2 if trade does not occur, which
implies that (SR1) never binds and δ1(0,s 2)=1−pδ1(1|θ)−(1−p)δ1(1|θ). The cost of increasing
the rent that P2 leaves to the agent is thus the (virtual) surplus that P1 forgoes by reducing the
level of trade in the upstream relationship. It is then immediate that for m2+b ≤ m1+a−
p
1−p∆a,
it is optimal to sell to either type, in which case there is no disclosure.
However, when m2 + b>m 1 + a −
p
1−p∆a, it is proﬁtable for P1 to sacriﬁce trade with the low
type to induce P2 to give the agent a price discount. The properties of the optimal mechanism then
depend on the price that P2 asks if P1 sells only to θ. When the complementarity is small so that
P2 asks a low price, P1 sells with certainty to the high type and with probability less than one to
the low type and does not disclose any information.
When the complementarity is strong, so that P2 is expected to ask a high price, P1 has two
options: sacriﬁce trade also with θ and guarantee that P2 will lower her price, or continue to trade
with certainty with the high type and use the disclosure policy to induce P2 to oﬀer a price discount
with probability positive, but less than one. When m1+¯ a ≤ m2+b, P1 ﬁnds it optimal to sacriﬁce
trade. When instead m1 +¯ a>m 2 + b, the optimal mechanism has the following structure:
θ −→ x1 =1 −→ s1 → t2 = b + g
&
θ −→ x1 =0 −→ s2 → t2 = b
19The other constraint δ1(1,s 1)g ≥ (m2 + b)δ1(0,s 1) is omitted since it never binds at the optimum.20 Calzolari and Pavan
Signal s1 can thus be interpreted as the decision to inform P2 that trade occurred in the upstream
relationship, s2 as the decision to keep all information secret. The optimal policy then consists in
not disclosing any information if A decides not to purchase (which occurs if and only if θ = θ)a n d
informing P2 with probability δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) ∈ (0,1) otherwise.20
Proposition 3 Suppose preferences are as in Condition (4) and x1 and x2 are complements. Dis-
closure is motivated by the possibility of inducing P2 to oﬀer the agent a price discount without
reducing the upstream level of trade. Disclosure is optimal when (i) the complementarity is suf-
ﬁciently strong that excluding the low type is not suﬃcient to induce P2 to ask a low price; (ii)
the cost of reducing the level of trade with the high type is greater than the beneﬁto fi n c r e a s i n g
the probability of a downstream price discount, whereas the opposite is true for the low type (i.e.
m1 +¯ a>m 2 + b>m 1 + a −
p
1−p∆a).
As for the eﬀects of disclosure on individual payoﬀs and welfare, when m1 +a−
p
1−p∆a>0 and
g<∆a(m2 + b)/(m1 + a − m2 − b), P1 would trade with either type with certainty if disclosure
were not allowed. Clearly, in this case, disclosure beneﬁts P1 but harms A and P2: by reducing
trade with the low type, P1 decreases the rent for θ and the surplus that P2 can extract from
θ. Furthermore, since it is always eﬃcient to trade in both relationships, disclosure is welfare-
decreasing.
In all other cases, disclosure leads to a Pareto improvement, since it does not aﬀect trade with
the low type (hence the rent for θ) and it either increases trade with the high type or leaves it
unchanged. P2 clearly beneﬁts from disclosure if it increases trade in the upstream relationship
and is indiﬀerent otherwise. Finally, since the optimal disclosure policy always induces P2 to ask
a low price when A does not purchase upstream, this guarantees that trade always occurs in the
downstream relationship thus maximizing eﬃciency.
Corollary 3 Disclosure harms P2 and A and is welfare-decreasing if it reduces the upstream level
of trade. Else, it leads to a Pareto improvement.
5.0.4 Substitutes
Finally, consider a situation where the products of the two sellers are substitutes, in which case the
agent obtains a positive surplus with P2 only if he does not reduce his valuation by purchasing from
P1. To be consistent with the notation used so far, we continue to denote by s1 the information
that induces P1 to ask a high price, so that t(s1)=b and t(s2)=b+g<b .The optimal mechanism
maximizes
U1 = pδ1(1|θ)(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)δ1(1|θ)(m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a)+δ1(0,s 2)|g|
subject to (IC1) and
|g|δ1(0,s 2) ≤ (m2 + b + g)δ1(1,s 2)( SR2)
20With a continuum of consumers, the optimal disclosure policy simply speciﬁes the fraction of transactions that
are disclosed to P2.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 21
Note that the upper bound for the rent that P2 leaves to the agent is (m2 + b + g)δ1(1,s 2) so that
it is always optimal to send signal s2 when A purchases from P1, which also implies that (SR1)
never binds and δ1(1,s 2)=pδ1(1|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(1|θ).
Since A now obtains a rent with P2 only if he does buy upstream, the optimal contracts compare
the surplus P1 can appropriate by trading with either type with what she can get by not selling and
making P2 oﬀer a lower price. Clearly, when |g| ≤ m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a, the rent A gets with P2 is so
small that it never pays to sacriﬁce upstream trade. On the contrary, when |g| >m 1 +a−
p
1−p∆a,
P1 ﬁnds it optimal not to sell to the low type. The optimal mechanism then depends on the
price P2 is expected to ask when P1 sells only to the high type. When substitutability is small,
selling only to θ suﬃces to induce P2 to ask a low price. In this case, the optimal mechanism is
δ∗
1(1|θ)=1=δ∗
1(0|θ)=1if |g| ≤ m1 +¯ a and δ∗
1(1|θ) ∈ (0,1) and δ∗
1(0|θ)=1otherwise. Indeed
when |g| >m 1 +¯ a, P1 ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to sacriﬁce trade with the high type as well, so as to
let the latter enjoy a downstream rent with positive probability. Trade with the high type is then
stochastic, but again the optimal mechanism does not require disclosure.
Next consider the less favorable case in which P2 is expected to ask a high price when P1 sells
only to θ. P1 then needs to sell with positive probability also to θ if she wants to reduce the
downstream price. The value of selling to the low type must then be adjusted to take into account
the increase in the probability of a downstream rent, as indicated in (SR2). It follows that for
m1 +a−
p
1−p∆a+m2 +b+g>0, selling to θ with positive probability is optimal for P1,i nw h i c h
case trade is stochastic and involves no disclosure. When this value is negative, however, it is more
proﬁtable to exclude the low type and induce P2 to leave a rent with probability less than one by
adopting a disclosure policy with the following structure:
θ −→ x1 =1 −→ s2 −→ t2 = b + g<b
%
θ −→ x1 =0 −→ s1 −→ t2 = b
As with complements, signal s1 can be interpreted as the decision to inform P2 that trade did not
occur upstream and s2 as the decision not to disclose any information.
Finally, note that for high levels of substitutability (i.e. |g| ≥ m2 + b) disclosure becomes
irrelevant, since P2 always asks a high price, whatever her beliefs about x1.
Proposition 4 Suppose preferences are as in Condition (4) and x1 and x2 are substitutes. Dis-
closure is motivated by the possibility of inducing P2 to oﬀer a price discount without increas-
ing the level of trade in the upstream relationship. Disclosure is optimal when (i) selling only to
the high type is not suﬃcient to induce P2 to ask a low price; (ii) the cost of selling to the low
type more than oﬀsets the beneﬁt of increasing the probability of a downstream price discount (i.e.
m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a + m2 + b + g<0).
Consider the eﬀects of disclosure on payoﬀs. When disclosure is not allowed, P1 has two options.
She may trade with both types with positive probability or else she may exclude the low type by
a s k i n gap r i c et1 = a that induces P2 to ask a high price t2 = b. In this latter case, disclosure22 Calzolari and Pavan
is clearly welfare-enhancing, since it does not aﬀect trade upstream and increases it downstream.
What is more, disclosure yields a Pareto improvement: P1 is clearly better oﬀ since disclosure is
strictly optimal; A is indiﬀerent since he gets no surplus with either principal anyway; and P2 is
also unaﬀected, since the optimal mechanism makes her just indiﬀerent between asking a high price
with certainty — as in the absence of disclosure — and reducing the price conditional on receiving
information s2.
On the contrary, when the optimal mechanism in the absence of disclosure is such that P1 sells
also to θ with positive probability so as to induce P2 to lower her price, A strictly suﬀers from
disclosure since it reduces the rent for θ. On the other hand, P2 beneﬁts from the reduction in
upstream trade, since this increases the agent’s willingness to pay downstream. The net eﬀect on
welfare then depends on whether it is eﬃcient for P1 to sell to the low type, that is on whether
m1 + a ≷ |g|.
Corollary 4 When disclosure reduces the upstream level of trade, it damages A and beneﬁts P1
and P2;i t se ﬀect on welfare is positive if and only if it is ineﬃcient to sell to the low type upstream.
In all other cases, disclosure yields a Pareto improvement.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have considered the dynamic interaction between two principals who contract sequentially
with the same agent. The focus is disclosure policies that control optimally for the exchange of
information between the two bilateral relationships. We have shown that the optimal policy is
keeping all information secret when: (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the
level of trade downstream; (b) the agent’s valuations are positively correlated so that the sign of the
single crossing condition is the same for upstream and downstream decisions; and (c) preferences in
the downstream relationship are additively separable, so that downstream decisions do not depend
on the upstream level of trade.
When any of these conditions is violated, however, there exist preferences for which disclosure is
strictly optimal, regardless of the price the downstream principal is willing to pay for information.
Finally, we have shown that the possibility of disclosing information does not necessarily harm
the agent and in some cases even leads to Pareto improvements.
To bring out the various eﬀects at work, we have examined the determinants of the disclosure
of exogenous and endogenous information separately. Further, the results have been derived under
the assumption that the upstream principal can commit perfectly to any privacy policy she chooses.
The design of optimal policies in environments where disclosure may be driven by a combination
of the diﬀerent determinants discussed above is an interesting line for future research. Similarly,
relaxing the assumption of full commitment may deliver new insights into the welfare eﬀects of
disclosure and the desirability of regulatory intervention in the area of privacy. We expect the main
strategic eﬀects that we have highlighted to prove useful also in the study of these more complex
environments.Privacy in Sequential Contracting 23
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7A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 . Under conditions (a) and (c), the preferences for P1, P2 and A can be
written as
v1 (x1,x 2,θ)=v1 (x1,θ),v 2 (x1,x 2,θ)=v1
2 (x1,θ)+v2





i (0,θ)=0for any θ ∈ Θ,j=1 ,2, and i =2 ,A. To save on notation, we let
W1(x1,θ) ≡ v1(x1,θ)+v1
A (x1,θ) and W2(x2,θ) ≡ v2
2(x2,θ)+v2
A(x2,θ).
The proof is by contradiction and is in four steps. Step 1 constructs the optimal mechanisms
{φ2(s)}s∈S. Step 2 identiﬁes necessary conditions for φ1 and {φ2(s)}s∈S to solve P1. Step 3 intro-
duces an alternative mechanism φND
1 — with reaction φND
2 — that does not disclose information and
induces the same upstream decisions as φ1. Step 4 proves that if φ1 and {φ2(s)}s∈S solve P1, so do
(φND
1 ,φ ND
2 ), contradicting the assumption that disclosure is strictly optimal.
Step 1. Since preferences in the downstream relationship are separable, the mechanisms {φ2(s)}s∈S
are independent of x1 so that x2(θE
2 ;s)=x2(e θ
E









2 =( e θ,e x1) such that θ = e θ. Indeed, for any mechanism φ2(s) that depends on x1, there exists
another mechanism φ0
2(s) that is independent of x1 and is payoﬀ-equivalent for all players. This
also implies that when P2 does not receive information, her optimal mechanism does not depend
of φ1 and will be denoted by φND
2 =( xND
2 (θ),U2ND
A (θ)). Finally, when W2(1,θ) ≤ 0 for one of the
two types, information disclosure is irrelevant since φ2 does not depend on P2’s posterior beliefs.



















2 (θ) = arg max
x2∈X2
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, for any individually rational and incentive-




























2 (θ),θ) − U2ND
A (θ)+v1
2 (1,θ)δ1(1|θ)]Pr(θ).26 Calzolari and Pavan
If φ1 and {φ2(s)}s∈S solve P1, then necessarily
















A(θ;s)[d(s|θ) − d(s|θ)] ≥ 0. (IC1)
Step 3. Consider now an alternative mechanism φND
1 that does not disclose information, that
















1 — with reaction φND










































Using (6), (8) and (9), (10) reduces to
U1(φ1) − U1(φND












[(1 − p)W2(x2(θ;s),θ) − p∆θv2
A(x2(θ;s),θ)]d(s|θ)
− γ[(1 − p)W2(xND
2 (θ),θ) − p∆θv2
A(xND
2 (θ),θ)].
Step 4. First, consider the last two terms in (11). From (7), the diﬀerence between these
two terms is never positive. Next, consider the ﬁrst term in (11). U2
A(θ;s) is increasing in the
posterior odds
μ(θ;s)
μ(θ;s) and hence in
d(s|θ)
d(s|θ).> From standard representation theorems (Milgrom, (1981)








≤ 0.21 We conclude that if φ1
and {φ2(s)}s∈S solve P1,s od o(φND
1 ,φ ND
2 ).
Proof of Theorem 1: Continuum of types and decisions. Assume θ is distributed
over Θ ≡ [θ,θ] with absolutely continuous log-concave c.d.f. F and density f strictly positive
over Θ. Furthermore, let X1 = X2 = R+ and suppose vi
A (xi,θ), v1 (x1,θ) and v2
2 (x2,θ) are thrice
21This also implies that if (IC1) is satisﬁed by φ1, then δ1(1|θ) ≥ δ1(1|θ) and hence (IC1) is satisﬁed also by φ
ND
1 .Privacy in Sequential Contracting 27

































∂θ2∂xi ≤ 0, for i =1 ,2. These
conditions are standard in mechanism design with a continuum of types (see Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991, Chapter 7) and imply that the optimal mechanism for a single principal controlling both x1
and x2 is deterministic and is characterized by two schedules x1(θ) and x2(θ) with no bunching.
It suﬃces to prove the result for γ =1 ; if disclosure is not optimal when γ =1 , it is clearly not
optimal for any γ<1. Letting Ψ(s|θ) and Γ(x1|θ) denote the c.d.f. of the lotteries over S ⊆ R and





































































A (x2(θ;s),θ) − t2(θ;s).
Now suppose P1 could control x2(θ) and t2(θ) directly. That is, consider a ﬁctitious mechanism e φ1 =
(e Γ(x1|θ), e Ψ(s|θ), e x2(θ;s),U A(θ;e φ1)) in which A must report θ only at t =1and where the lotteries
over X2 are obtained by combining e Ψ(s|θ) with e x2(θ;s).T h em e c h a n i s me φ1 which maximizes (12)
subject to standard individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints is deterministic
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Since in the absence of disclosure P2 oﬀers a mechanism such that xND












∂z dz, it follows that P1 can guarantee herself U1(e φ1) by







and committing not to disclose any information.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . We prove that there exists a threshold E(H) such that when
H<1 (respectively, H ≥ 1) disclosure is optimal if and only if e>E (H) > 0 (respectively,
e ≤ E(H) < 0).
Consider the program for the optimal mechanism as in the main text. First, note that (SR1)
and (SR2) cannot be both slack. If this were the case, P1 could reduce d(s1|θ) and increase d(s2|θ),
increasing her payoﬀ and relaxing (IC1). Second, using d(s1|θ)=1−d(s2|θ),c o n s t r a i n t(SR1) can
be rewritten as d(s2|θ) ≤ Hd(s2|θ)+1− H. When H<1,i f(SR2) is satisﬁed, so is (SR1).W h e n
instead H ≥ 1, (SR1) implies (SR2). Since at least one of these constraints must bind, it follows
that for H<1, (SR2) is binding and (SR1) is slack, whereas the opposite is true for H ≥ 1.
Also note that by increasing δ1(1|θ), P1 increases the objective function and relaxes (IC1).
Hence, at the optimum, trade occurs with certainty with θ.










max p(m1 +¯ a)+(1− p)δ1(1|θ)(m1 + a−
p
1−p∆a)+pe + d(s2|θ)[(1− p)e−p(1 − H)∆b]
subject to
[1 − δ1(1|θ)]∆a ≥ d(s2|θ)(1− H)∆b (IC1)
When m1+a−
p
1−p∆a<0,i ti sa l w a y so p t i m a ln o tt ot r a d ew i t ht h el o wt y p e ,i . e .δ∗
1(1|θ)=0 .
If (1 − p)e ≤ p(1 − H)∆b, the optimal disclosure policy is full privacy, that is d∗(s1|θ)=1for any




1−p∆a ≥ 0. If (1 − p)e ≤ p(1 − H)∆b, the optimal level of trade with θ is
δ∗
1(1|θ)=1and no disclosure is optimal (d∗(s1|θ)=1for any θ). If instead (1 − p)e>p(1 − H)∆b,
then (IC1) binds. Substituting δ1(1|θ)=1− d(s2|θ)(1− H) ∆b




U1 = p(m1 +¯ a + e)+( 1− p)(m1 + a −
p




1−p (1 − H)∆b +( 1− H) ∆b
∆a(m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a).
Note that E ≥ p(1−H)∆b/(1−p) when m1+a−
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0. Hence, if p(1−H)∆b/(1−p) <e≤ E,
δ∗
1(1|θ)=1and d∗(s1|θ)=1for any θ.I fi n s t e a de>E ,the optimal contract maximizes d(s2|θ)
under the constraint δ1(1|θ) ≥ 0. It follows that d∗(s2|θ)=m i n {1; ∆a/[(1 − H)∆b]}, d∗(s2|θ)=
Hd∗(s2|θ) and δ∗
1(1|θ)=1− d∗(s2|θ)(1− H) ∆b
∆a.
We conclude that with unfavorable beliefs, disclosure is optimal if and only if
e>E (H) ≡
p
1−p(1 − H)∆b +( 1− H) ∆b
∆aI[m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a] > 0. (13)
Case 2: Favorable beliefs (H ≥ 1). Substituting d(s1|θ)=Hd(s1|θ) and d(s2|θ)=1− d(s1|θ),






max p(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)δ1(1|θ)(m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a)+e − d(s1|θ)[(1− p)e − p(1 − H)∆b]
subject to
[1 − δ1(1|θ)]∆a ≥ (H − 1)∆bd(s1|θ)( IC1)
T h ep r o o ff o l l o w st h es a m es t e p sa sw i t hu n f a v o r a b l eb e l i e f s .
First, assume m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<0 so that δ∗
1(1|θ)=0 . When (1 − p)e ≥ p(1 − H)∆b, the
optimal policy is no disclosure: d∗(s1|θ)=0for any θ. When instead (1 − p)e<p(1 − H)∆b, U1
is increasing in d(s1|θ). The optimal policy is then d∗(s1|θ)=1 /H and d∗(s1|θ)=1if H∆a
(H−1)∆b ≥ 1
(the upper bound on d∗(s1|θ) comes from SR1), and d∗(s1|θ)= ∆a
(H−1)∆b and d∗(s1|θ)= H∆a
(H−1)∆b
otherwise (the upper bound on d∗(s1|θ) comes from (IC1)).
Next, assume m1+a−
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0. If (1 − p)e ≥ p(1 − H)∆b, the optimal policy is d∗(s1|θ)=0
for any θ,i nw h i c hc a s eδ∗
1(1|θ)=1 . If on the contrary (1 − p)e<p(1 − H)∆b,t h e n(IC1) binds.
Substituting δ1(1|θ)=1− (H − 1) ∆b
∆ad(s1|θ) from (IC1) into the objective function in PFav
1 gives
U1 = p(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)(m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a)+e − (1 − p)d(s1|θ)(e − E).
where E = E(H) is as in (13) but is now negative since H>1. If e>E ,then again δ∗
1(1|θ)=1and











We conclude that with favorable beliefs disclosure is optimal if and only if e<E (H) < 0.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y1 . To see that P2 is not aﬀected by disclosure, note that under the
optimal contracts derived in the proof of Proposition 1, (SR2) binds and (SR1) is slack when
H<1,w h e r e a st h eo p p o s i t ei st r u ew h e nH ≥ 1. This means that for s = s1 (respectively, s = s2
when H ≥ 1), P2 strictly prefers to ask the same price she would have asked in the absence of
disclosure, whereas for s = s2 (respectively, s = s1) she is indiﬀerent between asking t2 = b and
t2 = b. Together with the fact that U2 is independent of x1, this implies that P2 is just as well oﬀ
as in the absence of disclosure.30 Calzolari and Pavan
Next, consider the eﬀect of disclosure on A and assume favorable beliefs (the case H<1 is
discussed in the main text). Without disclosure, UA(θ;φND
1 )=0and UA(θ;φND
1 )=∆a + ∆b if
m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0 and UA(θ;φND




1(1|θ)∆a + d∗(s2|θ)∆b, where d∗(s2|θ) ∈ (0,1) and δ∗
1(1|θ) > 0 i fa n do n l yi f
m1+a−
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0. It follows that UA(θ;φ∗
1) <U A(θ;φND
1 ).W h i l et h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect of disclosure
on UA does not depend on e, the positive eﬀect on U1 increases without bound with |e|.I tf o l l o w s
that for moderate values of |e|, disclosure is welfare-decreasing, whereas the opposite is true for
large negative externalities.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Consider the program for the optimal mechanism as in the main text. First, note that it is
always optimal to sell to the low type, i.e. δ∗
1(1|θ)=1 . Second, note that when H ≥ 1, (SR1)
binds and (SR2) is slack, whereas the opposite is true when H<1 (the argument is identical to
that in the proof of Proposition 1).
Case 1: Favorable beliefs (H ≥ 1). From (SR1), d(s2|θ)=1 −H+Hd(s2|θ). Suppose d(s2|θ) < 1.
Then reducing d(s1|θ) to zero and increasing UA(θ;φ1) by ∆bd(s1|θ) increases U1 without violating
any of the constraints. Hence, necessarily d∗(s2|θ)=d∗(s2|θ)=1 , which implies that full privacy
is always optimal with favorable beliefs. When ∆b ≥ |∆a|, the optimal contracts are such that
UA(θ;φ∗
1)=∆b − |∆a|,U A(θ;φ∗
1)=0and δ∗












Case 2: Unfavorable beliefs (H<1). First, observe that at the optimum (IC1) must be
saturated. If this were not true, then necessarily UA(θ;φ1)=0and δ1(1|θ)=1 , since otherwise
P1 could reduce UA(θ;φ1) and/or increase δ1(1|θ) enhancing her payoﬀ. But then from (IC1) and
(IC1), 0 ≥ UA(θ;φ1) − d(s2|θ)∆b + |∆a| ≥ [d(s2|θ) − d(s2|θ)]∆b, which is consistent with (SR2)
only if d(s2|θ)=d(s2|θ)=0 ,i nw h i c hc a s eUA(θ;φ1)=d(s2|θ)∆b − |∆a|,i m p l y i n gt h a t(IC1) is
saturated.
Next, we establish that UA(θ;φ∗
1)=0 . Again, suppose this is not true. Then necessarily
UA(θ;φ1)=0 , since otherwise P1 could reduce both rents by the same amount. Using the re-
sult that (IC1) necessarily binds, we have that UA(θ;φ1)=d(s2|θ)∆b − δ1(1|θ)|∆a|. Replacing




+( 1− p){m1 + a}
which is increasing in δ1(1|θ). But then δ1(1|θ)=m i n
n
d(s2|θ)H ∆b




where the upper bound comes from (IR1) and (IC1) substituting UA(θ;φ1) and UA(θ;φ1) and
using (SR2). If ∆b ≤ |∆a|, min
n
d(s2|θ)H ∆b






1)=0 . If instead ∆b>|∆a|, then U1 is maximized at d(s2|θ)=
|∆a|





1)=δ1(1|θ)|∆a| − d(s2|θ)∆b into U1, and using (SR2),Privacy in Sequential Contracting 31
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max
φ1∈Φ1
pδ1(1|θ)(m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a|)+( 1− p)(m1 + a)+d(s2|θ)H∆b
subject to
δ1(1|θ) ≥ d(s2|θ)H ∆b
|∆a|, (IR1)
δ1(1|θ) ≤ 1 − d(s2|θ) ∆b
|∆a|(1 − H). (IC1)
Note that (IR1) and (IC1) can be jointly satisﬁe di fa n do n l yi fd(s2|θ) ≤
|∆a|
∆b .
If m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a| < 0, (IR1) binds. Replacing δ∗
1(1|θ)=d(s2|θ)H ∆b
|∆a| into the objective
function in PHD
1 gives
U1 = d(s2|θ)H∆b[1 +
p
|∆a|
(m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a|)] + (1 − p)(m1 + a),















1(1|θ)=1 , and δ∗
1(1|θ)=d∗(s2|θ)H ∆b
|∆a|.
If instead m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a| ≥ 0, then (IC1) binds, in which case P1’s payoﬀ reduces to
U1 = {H∆b − p(m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a|) ∆b
|∆a| (1 − H)}d(s2|θ)+p(m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a|)
+( 1− p)(m1 + a).




p(1−H), U1 is again increasing in d(s2|θ). The optimal mechanism then














p(1−H), then U1 is decreasing
in d(s2|θ) and at the optimum d∗(s2|θ)=d∗(s2|θ)=0and δ∗
1(1|θ)=δ∗
1(1|θ)=1 .





P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y2 . That P2 is not aﬀected by disclosure follows from the same arguments
as in the proof of Corollary 1.




1(1|θ)|∆a| − d∗(s2|θ)∆b. In contrast, without disclosure, UA(θ;φND
1 )=0and
UA(θ;φND
1 )=|∆a| if m1 + a −
1−p




p |∆a| < 0,U A(θ;φ∗
1)=0and hence disclosure leads to a Pareto improvement
(P1 is strictly better oﬀ, A and P2 are indiﬀerent).32 Calzolari and Pavan


























,i m p l y i n gt h a tA is strictly
worse oﬀ.A sf o rt h ee ﬀect of disclosure on total welfare,
U1(φ∗
1) − U1(φND
1 )={H∆b − p(m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a|) ∆b











= −{(1 − H)∆b + p(m1 + a −
1−p
p |∆a|) ∆b
|∆a| (1 − H)}min{1,
|∆a|
∆b } < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.
The optimal mechanism maximizes









δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ) ≥ δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ), (IC1)
g[pδ1(1,s 1|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 1|θ)] ≥ (m2 + b)
£
pδ1(0,s 1|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 1|θ)
¤
, (SR1)
g[pδ1(1,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 2|θ)] ≤ (m2 + b)
£
pδ1(0,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 2|θ)
¤
. (SR2)
At the optimum, (SR1) never binds and δ∗
1(0,s 1|θ)=0for any θ. Indeed, reducing δ1(0,s 1|θ)
and increasing δ1(0,s 2|θ) relaxes (SR1) and (SR2) without aﬀecting (IC1) and U1.C o n s t r a i n t
(IC1) can also be ignored, since it is always satisﬁed at the optimum.
Next, note that the maximal surplus that P1 can appropriate from P2 by reducing the level of
trade upstream and disclosing signal s2 instead of s1 is bounded from above by the right hand side
in (SR2). On the other hand, the cost of creating a downstream rent is the surplus that P1 forgoes
when she does not trade, i.e.
pδ1(0,s 2|θ)(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 2|θ)(m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a).
When m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≥ m2 + b,
pδ1(0,s 2|θ)(m1 +¯ a)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 2|θ)(m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a) >g [pδ1(1,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 2|θ)]
and hence the optimal mechanism is simply δ∗
1(1,s 1|θ)=1for any θ and does not require disclosure.
On the contrary, when m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<m 2 + b, at the optimum, δ∗
1(1,s 1|θ)=0 . If this
were not true, P1 could transfer an ε probability from δ1(1,s 1|θ) to δ1(0,s 2|θ) and then increasePrivacy in Sequential Contracting 33
δ1(1,s 2|θ) by
ε(m2+b)
g reducing δ1(1,s 1|θ) by the same amount. This would increase her payoﬀ,
without aﬀecting (SR2). Hence δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=1− δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ). Furthermore, if δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) > 0, then
necessarily δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=1 . To see this, ﬁrst suppose that δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ) > 0. Since m1 +¯ a>m 1 + a −
p
1−p∆a, P1 could then transfer an ε probability from δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ) to δ∗




1(1,s 2|θ) to δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ) increasing U1 without any eﬀect on (SR2). Hence, if δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) > 0,
then necessarily δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=0 . Next, suppose that δ∗
1(1,s 1|θ) > 0.P 1 could then transfer an ε
probability from δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) to δ∗




g ) and increase
δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) by the same amount. Once again, since m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<m 2 + b, this would increase
U1, without aﬀecting (SR2). We conclude that if δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) > 0, then necessarily δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=1 .
First, consider the case in which −g<m 1+a−
p
1−p∆a<m 2+b. Since m1+a−
p
1−p∆a+g>0,U 1
is increasing in δ1(1,s 2|θ) and hence (SR2) binds at the optimum. When gp ≤ (m2+b)(1− p), the
optimal mechanism is δ∗






On the contrary, when pg > (1 − p)(m2+b), necessarily δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1and δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) ∈ (0,1). The
optimal mechanism then depends on the comparison between m1+¯ a and m2+b. If m1+¯ a>m 2+b,
then δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=0 . To see this, note that by reducing δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ) and δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) respectively by
ε and
ε(m2+b)
g and increasing δ∗





,P 1 increases U1 without any eﬀect on




1(1,s 1|θ), whereas for





Finally, consider m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≤− g. In this case, δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1is optimal since U1 is
decreasing in δ1(1,s 2|θ). Following the same steps as in the previous case, when pg ≤ (1 − p)(m2+
b),δ ∗












We conclude that disclosure is optimal if and only if (i) g>[(1 − p)(m2 + b)]/p, i.e. when the
complementarity is suﬃciently strong that excluding the low type is not suﬃcient to induce P2 to
ask a low price and (ii) m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<m 2 + b<m 1 +¯ a, that is, when the cost of reducing
trade with the high type is higher than the beneﬁt of increasing the downstream rent, whereas the
opposite is true with the low type.
Proof of Corollary 3. Step 1 derives the optimal mechanism φND
1 when P1 is not allowed to
disclose information and (i) g>[(1 − p)(m2+b)]/p and (ii) m1+a−
p
1−p∆a<m 2+b<m 1+¯ a,i n
which case disclosure would have been optimal for P1.S t e p2c o m p a r e sp a y o ﬀs in this mechanism
with those in the optimal mechanism derived in the proof of Proposition 3.
Step 1. Among all mechanisms that induce P2 to set a high price t2 = b + g, the one that
maximizes U1 is δ1(1|θ)=δ1(1|θ)=1if m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0, and δ1(1|θ)=1and δ1(1|θ)=0
otherwise, yielding a payoﬀ U
b+g
1 =m a x {m1 + a;p(m1 + a)}. In contrast, among all mechanisms34 Calzolari and Pavan
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+( 1− p)(1− δ1(1|θ))
¤
, (SR)
Following the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3), under (i) and (ii), the solution to
PND
1 is δ1(1|θ)= m2+b




The optimal contract φND
1 is obtained comparing U
b+g
1 with Ub












1 if and only if g ≥
(1−p)(m2+b)(m1+a)
p(m1+a)−m2−b .
Step 2.S i n c eUA(θ;φND
1 )=δ1(1|θ)∆a, UA(θ;φ∗
1)=[ δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ)]∆a and UA(θ;φND
1 )=
UA(θ;φ∗
1)=0 , disclosure damages A if and only if it reduces the upstream level of trade with the
low type. From Step 1, this occurs when m1+a−
p
1−p∆a ≥ 0 and g ≥ ∆a(m2+b)/[m1+a−m2−b].
In this case, disclosure also harms P2 since it decreases the value θ attaches to downstream contract-
ing. Furthermore, since it is eﬃcient to trade in both relationships, disclosure is welfare-decreasing.
In all other cases, disclosure yields a Pareto improvement, since it does not aﬀect trade with θ and
it either increases trade with θ, or else it leaves it unchanged.
Proof of Proposition 4.
The optimal contracts maximize









δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ) ≥ δ1(1,s 1|θ)+δ1(1,s 2|θ), (IC1)
|g|
£
pδ1(0,s 1|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 1|θ)
¤
≥ (m2 + b + g)
£





pδ1(0,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(0,s 2|θ)
¤
≤ (m2 + b + g)
£
pδ1(1,s 2|θ)+( 1− p)δ1(1,s 2|θ)
¤
. (SR2)
At the optimum, δ∗
1(1,s 1|θ)=0for any θ. Indeed, by reducing δ∗
1(1,s 1|θ) and increasing δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ),
P1 relaxes (SR1) and (SR2) with no eﬀect on (IC1) and U1. It follows that constraint (SR1) can be
neglected. Constraint (IC1) will also be ignored since it never binds. Also note that δ∗
1(0,s 1|θ)=0 ,
since otherwise P1 could reduce δ∗
1(0,s 1|θ) and increase δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) relaxing (SR2) and increasing
U1.
If |g| ≤ m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a, the optimal mechanism is simply δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=1 .
If, instead, m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<|g| <m 1 +¯ a, the unconstrained solution is δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=
δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1and satisﬁes (SR2) if and only if |g| ≤ p(m2+b). If, however, p(m2+b) < |g| ≤ m2+b,Privacy in Sequential Contracting 35
then (SR2) binds and δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ) < 1. The optimal mechanism then depends on the sign of
m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a + m2 + b + g. When it is positive, δ∗




|g| )ε and increasing δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) and δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ) respectively by ε and
m2+b+g
|g| ε increases
U1 without any eﬀect on (SR2). The optimal mechanism is then δ∗





1(1,s 2|θ). When instead m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a + m2 + b + g<0,
by the same argument, δ∗








Finally, if |g| >m 1+¯ a, then (SR2) always binds, since the unconstrained solution is δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=
δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1 . If δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ) > 0, then necessarily δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1 . Otherwise, P1 could transfer an ε
probability from δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ) to δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) and
p
1−pε probability from either δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ) or δ∗
1(0,s 1|θ) to
δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ) increasing U1 without violating (SR2). It follows that for |g| ≤ p(m2 + b),δ ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=
1, δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=|g|/[p(m2 + b)] and δ∗
1(0,s 2|θ)=1− δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ), whereas for |g| >p (m2 + b),
δ∗
1(1,s 2|θ)=1 , in which case the solution coincides with that for m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a<|g| <m 1 +¯ a.
We conclude that disclosure is optimal if and only if (i) p(m2 + b) < |g| <m 2 + b and (ii)
m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a + m2 + b + g<0.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y4 . Step 1 derives the optimal mechanism when P1 cannot disclose
information and (i) p(m2 + b) < |g| <m 2 + b and (ii) m1 + a −
p
1−p∆a + m2 + b + g<0,i nw h i c h
case disclosure would have been optimal for P1. Step 2 compares payoﬀs in this mechanism with
those in the optimal mechanism derived in the proof of Proposition (4).
Step 1. When (ii) holds, necessarily m1+a−
p
1−p∆a<0, since m2+b+g>0. This implies that
among all mechanisms that induce P2 to ask a high price, the one that maximizes U1 is δ1(1|θ)=1
and δ1(0|θ)=1and yields a payoﬀ Ub
1 = p(m1+a). In contrast, among all mechanisms that induce
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1−pδ1(1|θ),w h i c h
clearly binds since m1+a−
p
1−p∆a<0. Substituting δ1(1|θ) into the objective function, we have that
U1 is increasing in δ1(1|θ) and hence the solution to PND
1 is δ1(1|θ)=1and δ1(1|θ)=
|g|−p(m2+b)
(1−p)(m2+b).
Comparing the payoﬀ for P1 in this mechanism with the payoﬀ in the mechanism that induces a










0 otherwise36 Calzolari and Pavan




p(m2+b)−|g|, d i s c l o s u r el e a d st oaP a r e t oi m p r o v e m e n t :A and P2





the level of trade upstream and leaves it unchanged downstream: A is worse oﬀ, P1 and P2 better
oﬀ. Disclosure is welfare-increasing if and only if it is ineﬃcient to sell to θ upstream, i.e. if and
only if |g| ≥ m1 + a.